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Writing Reality:
Constructivism, Metaphor, and Cosmology
Mary C. Daane

W the floor, walls, and ceiling of our existence" (Nouwen, 1 98 1 , p. 3 1 ) , from
hen l anguage i nstructors teach from the conviction that "words form

a recognition that language is both the foundation and reflection of students'
reality, value systems, experiences, and ways of being in the world, instructors
receive and evaluate their students ' di scourse as far more significant than
accumulations of discrete achievement skills . This constructivist (Ortony 1 979)
or experientialist (Lakoff & Johnson, 1 980) perspective sensitizes teachers to a
holistic view of their student s ' linguistic lives; often constructivist teachers
assign activities that encourage students to use "expressive" language, language
that i s "close to the self' and gives signals about [students] as well as signals
about [ s tudents ' ] topic [ s ] " ( B ri tton, 1 9 8 2 , pp. 96-9 7 ) . By doing this, the
"constructivist" teacher becomes privy to the recurrent themes and metaphors
by which students render their identities.
In recent years epi stemic theory in many disciplines has drifted from
taxonomy to "linguisticality" (Foucault, 1 973 ), resulting in a burgeoning of
publications on metaphor. Surprisingly, though, the trend has given rise to very little
discussion about the significance of metaphor in writing theory. In fact, Seitz's
"Composition's Misunderstanding of Metaphor" ( 1 99 1 ) notes a paradox in the field's
persistence in viewing metaphor as something to be isolated, controlled, even
expunged from student writing and discussions about writing, for the sake of clarity.
As Booth ( 1978) reminds us, "The quality of any culture is in large part the quality of
the metaphorists that it creates and sustains" (p. 72).
Metaphors help thinkers and writers forge new connections, relevancies,
realities and, at the same time, control the way they view the world. For this
reason the discussion of metaphor should no longer be closeted in the literature
class; a theoretical understanding of language, metaphor, and the reality they
embrace is as essential to contemporary composition pedagogy as it is has al
ways been to poetry and metaphysics. Those who take language seriously and
acknowledge its power to change lives and, consequently, the world, recognize
that composition classes must be more than laboratories to dissect syntax and
paragraph patterns; composition classes must become studios where students'
inchoate potentials can be trans formed by the magic of metaphor from the
unspeakable within to an articulate without.

Basic Philosophies of Language
S ince the time of Aristotle and throughout the history of Western thought,
Mary Daane is Assistant Professor of English and reading and Chairperson of the Division of
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"obj ectivi sm" (Johnson, 1 987) has dominated philo sophical approaches to
language. Briefly, the objectivist understanding holds that language relates in a
one-to-one, precise manner to a reality that is disembodied or separate and out
side of human thought, i . e . , words have exact meanings that fit the properties of
the world we live in. Collaterally, the objectivists consider knowledge fixed and
accessible; for them, "the cat sat on the mat" means one and only one thing to all
competent speakers of English. Objectivity i s possible and necessary for reason;
absolute and knowable truth exists and may be derived by impersonal and
rational analys i s . Moreover, the vocabularies of philosophy and science are
accurate, and the formulations of these disciplines can correctly describe and
predict the universe.
In the twentieth century an alternate understanding of language evolved from
the work of such philosophers as Kant ( 1 781 1 1 965), Ricoeur ( 1 976), Vygotsky
( 1 962), and Whorf ( 1 956). This new approach i s aphorized in Wittgenstein's
( 1 95 3 ) often cited statement, "The limits of my language are the limits of my
world. " This new point of view led to the now widely-held conviction that the
l anguage we generate both creates and communicates a constructed reality,
shaping our value systems and our ways of being in the world. Indeed, accepting
the breach between the world and the word accounts for the postmodern view of
an indeterminate reality.
Those who hold this view of reality argue that truth is a product of our cultur
ally determined thought sy stem and our particular experiences within that
culture, not of some absolute or neutral set of pan-human concepts. Rorty ' s ( 1 990)
comment, "Truth i s simply a compliment paid to sentences seen to be paying
their way" ( a s c ited in Klepp, 1 990, p. 1 1 8) , makes this very point. For
constructivists, objectivity i s not nullified but understood to remain possible
within the framework of cultural supports and limitations. From this stance, ra
tionality appears to rest on both logic and imagination. Therefore, a set of infor
mational propositions may yield many validly reasoned conclusions that will vary
individually depending on the experiences, imagination, and available linguistic
resources. Accordingly, any individual ' s understanding of "the cat sat on the mat"
is shaped by earlier personal encounters with, and cultural perspectives on, both
c at s and mat s . P h i l o s ophers who acknowledge the human propen s ity for
"seeing-as" (Wittgenstein, 1 9 5 3 , p. 1 93 ) are known as con structiv i s t s or
experienti al i s t s . They view language and imagination as endowments that
l i berate us from the constraints of absolute meaning and thereby elevate
linguistic expression beyond the skill category to a "phenomenon of freedom"
(Steiner, 1 989, p. 1 5 1 ) .

Constructivism and Metaphor
In order to derive a correspondence between metaphor and cosmology, I settle
on one point of view as to how metaphors operate or what they do. There are
generally three positions on this issue.
First, the substitution view considers metaphors "fuzzy and vague, inessen
tial frills, appropriate for the purposes of the politician and of the poet, but not
for those of the scientist, who is attempting to furnish an objective description of
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physical reality" (Ortony, 1 979, p. 2). This objectivist approach holds that "meta
phors are essentially linguistic ornaments for which their more prosaic equiva
lents can be readily substituted" (Ortony, 1 985 , p. 1 5 3). In that view, Yeats ' ( 1 927/
1 962) lines from "Sailing to Byzantium" : "An aged man i s but a paltry thing,/ A
tattered coat upon a stick . . . ," are simply an unnecessary embellishment having
the semantic equivalent of the literal, drab, but more precise, "An old man is
insignificant, frayed, brittle and frail" (p. 95).
A second position on metaphor, the comparative view, has its roots in
Aristotelian philosophy. Aristotle in "On Poetics" defines metaphor as "the intuitive
perception of the similarity in dissimilars." This belief that metaphor allows language
users to propose otherwise similarities differs little from the substitution view, for the
comparison view finds "every metaphor to be a condensed or elliptic simile" (Richards,
1 936, pp. 35-36). Thus, the comparison view, just another spin on the substitution
view, would find Yeats' line an expendable, implied simile approximating, "An old
man looks like a tattered coat hanging on a stick."
A third view of metaphor, one that is consistent with the constructivist view, holds
that the terms of a metaphor interact to set off a chain of associations that give rise to
an altogether new meaning, one that conjures far more than the meaning constituted
by the original terms . This view, arising from R ichard s ' discussion of the
"interanimation of words" (as cited in Black, 1 979), holds that new meaning arises,
not from the words themselves, but from a new or startling juxtaposition of words.
The interactionist position on Yeats' line would hold that readers bring their own
associations, thoughts, feelings, reminiscences about old men, tattered coats, and sticks;
thus, individuals ' interpretations of the line will vary. The interactionist view i s
consistent with contemporary reader response theory in describing meaning, not as
captured ideas inalterably preserved by the page, but as variable incantations at the
juncture of the word, the reader, the culture, and the moment.
In the constructivist universe, both the substitution and the comparison views
are inadequate, for if all language i s seen as a reflection of the user's view of
reality, and if an objective reality i s understood to be a myth, then all language is
seen to be more or less removed from the objects and phenomena to which it
refers . If nothing in the lexicon conforms directly and absolutely to reality, then
everything in the lexicon is a metaphor for that reality. Thus the difference
between literal and figurative language is quantitative rather than qualitative.
The i ssue i s not whether or not an expression i s metaphorical but whether it is
metaphorical enough for the average, competent language user to recognize its
metaphoricity. Black ( 1 979) and others have differentiated between "live" and
"dead" metaphors. A live metaphor is one that is syntactically j arring enough to
catch the attention of a reader or listener. On the other hand, dead metaphors are
those that have become so automatic that average u sers barely note their
metaphoricity; head of the family, arm of the chair, and foot of the bed are
everyday metaphorical expressions we rarely note as such.

Metaphor and Reality
Several commentators have taken exception to the objectivist position that
finds metaphors "unimportant, deviant, and parasitic on 'normal usage"' (Ortony,
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1979 , p. 2 ) . Levin ( 1 979) maintains that when we respond to metaphorical
constructions, we do not construe "the utterance so that it makes sense of the
world, we construe the world so as to make sense of the utterance" (p. 1 3 1 ) .
Encountering a metaphor, w e complete a quick mental check o f the meanings of
the terms and conjure an imaginary reality to make that anomalous expression
sensible. Thus, the notion that metaphors are aberrant expressions i s superseded
b y the idea that the l anguage is impeccable; j u st the facts are deranged.
Metaphors are to be taken literally; "They mean what they say-what gives i s
the world" (p. 13 1 ) .
For those who see truth a s a matter o f "fitting words t o the world" (Lakoff &
Johnson, 1 980, p. 1 96), concession to a new reality can imply falsehood and lies.
Empson ( 1 951) noted that the truth or falsity of literary works i s not the issue;
when contracting with a text, readers are expected to rearrange the world to match
the writer ' s creation.
A prototype of the notion that metaphor creates truth w as reified in the works
of literary Romantic s . Coleridge' s "willing suspension of disbelief" (as cited in
Salingar, 1966, p. 89), the condition necessary for the reader ' s transaction with
the text, and Keats' ( 1 8 1 7 / 1 967) "negative capability" (p. 399), the tolerance for
the ambiguity of paradox, and Shelley ' s ( 1 8401 1 967) "Defense of Poetry," which
argues that poetry "creates anew the universe" (p. 483) are all concepts that fore
shadowed the constructivist position on language.
Identifying poets as seers and visionaries popular to Western stereotypes
attests to an understanding that the metaphors of poetry do not stand as merely
juxtaposed to logical descriptions of reality, but actually create a transcendent
reality for reader consideration. In other words, the truth of language is located
in its removal from the world-its otherworldliness. The concept of objective
reality makes a faulty backdrop for interpreting linguistic constructions. One
contemporary humorist concisely settled the conflict between the objectivist and
constructivist points of view: "In cases of maj or discrepancy [between literature
and life] it's always reality that's got it wrong . . . . Reality is frequently inaccurate"
(Adams, 1 980, p. 38).
Just as any consideration of metaphor on a scale polarized between truth and
falsity is untenable, so is any attempt to fix discriminations between the literal
and the metaphorical. In the constructivist or experientialist view, literal and
metaphorical expressions are not separate species but variants of a single breed
human language. We cannot claim that metaphors are present in some texts and
absent from others. All texts are rife with metaphors, a few arresting, most veiled
in everyday use. This blurring of the literal/metaphorical distinction reflects the
postmodern mischief which aims to deconstruct and level many of the pet valua
tions in Western philosophy ' s collection of hierarchical opposites, including true/
false, real/fictional, objective/subjective, and literal/metaphorical.

A Constructivist Cosmology
In the objectivist system, metaphor is considered the sole province of the
literary mind that is interested in the subtleties and amenities of language. It i s
not. I t i s a t the very core of o u r learning, thinking, and writing. Noting the
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omnipresence of metaphor, Seitz ( 1 99 1 ) reminds the field of the futility of its
recommendations that figurative expressions be replaced with literal explana
tions ; "we cannot catch up to the speed of figuration nor somehow hold it still
with literal language" (p. 290). We have also seen that the literal can be called
metaphorical, that metaphor can be taken literally, that through language humans
create their own reality. To complete the circle, we can even claim, with Galeano
( 1 989/ 1 99 1 ), that "[p]erhaps we are the words that tell us who we are" (p. 1 8)
that it i s the language that has created the human.
B iolinguists assert that language defines humans and separates them from the
animal kingdom; words elevate us "above the silence of plants and the grunts of
beasts" (B artel, 1 983, p.75). Dennett ( 1 99 1 ) refutes Wittgenstein ' s comment:
'"If a lion could talk, we could not understand him"' by claiming " [If] a lion
could talk that lion would have a mind so different from the general run of lion
minds, that although we could understand him just fine, we would learn little
about ordinary lions from him" (as cited in Johnson, 1 99 1 , p. 60). To paraphrase
Primo Levi ( 1 989), the "whine of an animal" is not a text (p. 1 72). While animals
may s ig n a l w i t h their whimpers and w h i n ni e s , their n o i s e s are neither
paraphrastic nor inventive.
The equation of language with creation i s nearly as old as Western culture
itself. The first chapter, third verse, of Genesis tells of a God who speaks cre
ation (And God said, Let there be light: and there was light) and names our exis
tential opposites, night and day, heaven and earth. The opening chapter of the
Gospel of John, first verse, repeats this theme; "In the beginning was the Word,
and the Word was with God, and the Word was God." The last verse of "The
Revelation of John" lists those who will be excluded from messianic Jerusalem:
"dogs, fortune tellers, and the sexually immoral, murderers, idolaters, and every
one of false speech and false life," reflecting both a pre- and post-modern stance
on the power of language to define reality. The kingdom of God is gained by
utterance, not grace.
The great prophets and mystics have always known this , and that is why the
great religious texts are built on allegory, parable, proverb, and magical imagery.
Jesus, Lao-Tzu, Muhammad, Siddhartha, the Zen Masters, and the Hasidic Zaddiks
all worked from a tacit understanding that humans recoil from the bald truth, that
seekers are more likely to accept new theological premises when they are
presented indirectly. Often the new religious values are disguised in stories
i n v o l v i n g c o mmonplace s i tuation s , s u c h a s a l l e g o r i e s and parab l e s , o r
paradoxical puzzlers like those found in the O l d Testament book of "Proverbs,"
the Tao Te Ching, and Zen koans.
Ben Shahn's ( 1 954) telling of the "The Alphabet of Creation," a legend from
the Zohar, the Kabbalah ' s primary mystical text, derived from ancient Gnostic
tales begins:
Twenty-six generations before the creation of the world, the twenty
two letters of the alphabet descended from the crown of God whereon
they were engraved with a pen of flaming fire. They gathered around
about God and one after another spoke and entreated, each one, that
the world be created through him. (pp. 1 -2)
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According to the legend, the Lord chose to fashion the heavens and earth with
the masculine Beth and the feminine Aleph. Aleph's selection was a reward for
her modesty (a conceit that has had for millennia a profound effect on human
expectations about women).
In a recent article on quantum cosmology, Primack and Abrams ( 1 995)
remind us of another account of creation involving language found in Jewish
midrashic literature. "Genesis Rabbah 1 : 1 say s : 'The Holy one in creating the
universe, . . . worked from a plan-the Torah' " (p. 7 1 ) . Moreover, the notion that
language can form the universe is not peculiar to the traditions of Judaeo
Christian creationism. The Buddhist monks' chant, "Aouhm," vocalizes from
back to front of the mouth, a gloss of all the speaking positions . The gloss itself
functions as an auditory metonymy, a symbolic reiteration of the act of creation.
If, mythologically speaking, l anguage created the universe, and if we, as
members of the universe, have been given power over language, then we, too,
have been endowed w ith the power of creati o n . "The exerc i s e of human
language enacts, albeit on a microscopically humble scale, the divine reflexes of
creation, the Logos or ' speaking into being' of the universe" (Steiner, 1 97 1 ,
p . 7 5 ) . "One word can cripple a human relationship, can do dirt on hope"
(Steiner, 1 989, p. 58).
Language and metaphor are our human trust; through them we spell our
v i sion of the now and the forever. A s huma n s , our nature is to use them
constructively. As teachers, it i s our responsibility to empower our students to
use their linguistic and metaphorical birthrights to construct and re-construct their
intellectual, political, and even their spiritual lives; for by their own metaphors
will they be known and will they know. We must teach with the conviction of
Vaclav Havel: "Transcendence is the only real alternative to extinction" (as cited
in Primack & Abrams, 1 995, p. 73). If we fail in this obligation, we risk revert
ing to the abyss of unspeakability. c::::J
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